CHARLES TAYLOR FINALLY FOUND GUILTY...

One has to applaud those who were responsible for finally bringing ex-Liberian President Charles Taylor to justice as well as what must be considered a landmark verdict.

 

Having at long last been found guilty of his war crimes, which were numerous and horrific – it is just a pity it took so long to bring him before the courts. I can only hope he won’t be given upmarket living quarters with all the luxuries he needs to satisfy his human rights.

What also concerns me somewhat is that I suspect that this is merely lip service being paid to the ex-dictator. I sincerely hope I am wrong. Time will tell how the punishment will be applied. I just hope it will be as harsh as it can possibly be.

 

It is a sad fact that this person was welcomed into South Africa as a hero of sorts and regarded as a great friend despite him being unable to quench his blood-lust and desire to terrorise, destabilise and steal the resources of another country. Hopefully, the large diamond he presented with such modest fanfare to Naomi Campbell will find its way back to those who it rightfully belongs to.

 

Whereas I applaud the verdict, what about the victims he and his thugs created? The suffering and misery these poor souls have had to endure defies belief. For them, his verdict may bring some satisfaction but it will never turn back the clock and give them back their lives.

 

What about the people who trained his so-called Presidential Guard, knowing full well that their students of mayhem were to be deployed in Sierra Leone to support the RUF and conduct atrocities against the innocent and the helpless?? Let us also not forget that this “Presidential Guard” was used to “pacify” and punish thousands of people in Liberia as well.

 

Apparently, the man who secured the contract to train Taylor’s Presidential Guard was the same man who for years, despite international embargos, supplied UNITA (who by the way did a lot of murdering as well) with a surface-to-air missile to shoot down an EO aircraft which resulted in two good men being killed.

 

I can only hope that more of Taylor’s associates and “business partners” will be brought to book.

 

Perhaps the guilty verdict will finally send a clear warning to those in power who believe they are immune to any laws and can therefore rape, murder and plunder as they see fit.

 

As always, only time will tell how serious we are about bringing these murderers and dictators to justice – or not.

PRINCIPLES OF THE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK

The aim of the attack is to disrupt, disorganise and destroy the enemy.

The principles of the attack are as follows:

1.      The CoG must be targeted

2.      Fire-and-manoeuvre must be exploited

3.      The attack must be organised in depth

4.      The attack must be launched from a firm base

5.      The start of the attack must be secured

6.      The tempo and momentum of the attack must be maintained

7.      The attack must be supported by maximum firepower

8.      Assault forces must move close to supporting fire

9.      Support weapons must be brought forward as soon as possible

10.   Relentless execution.

The CoG must be targeted: The enemy’s Centre of Gravity and those strong points that protect it must be located and targeted. Their destruction will bring about a weakening or a collapse in the enemy’s defences. The destruction of the CoG is a key to victory. (The COG must not be confused with the Trinity of Gravity in unconventional warfare)

Fire-and-manoeuvre: The ability to manoeuvre and utilise direct and indirect firepower to achieve advantageous positions in relation to the enemy must be exploited at all times. All engagements are reliant on fire-and-manoeuvre. Fire without manoeuvre and manoeuvre without fire is of no value. Fire-and-manoeuvre adds to momentum.

Depth: Depth in the attacking forces ensures momentum, provides flexibility, space and options for manoeuvre and additionally reduces casualties amongst the attacking forces.

Firm bases: The attack must begin from a firm base and as the attack develops, commanders must continue establishing firm bases (overwatch positions). This allows the attacking forces to maintain “one foot on the ground” and thus retain balance during the attack. Firm bases make it difficult for the enemy to launch successful counter attacks. Firm bases are established on terrain that provides the attacking forces an advantage in terms of fire and observation.

Secured start: The attack must be launched from a secure position to prevent assault forces from making immediate contact with the enemy as this will make deployment difficult and derail fire plans, especially indirect fire plans. Starting an attack from an unsecured position will give the enemy the initiative, adversely affect own forces morale, create casualties and confusion within the attacking force and disrupt the attack plan.

Tempo and momentum: Maintaining the tempo and momentum of the attack will ensure sustained pressure on the enemy. Sustained pressure will prevent the enemy from being able to reorganise and counter the attack, bring his reserves forward or prepare new positions. Aggressive execution will result in a rapid, relentless attack

Maximum firepower: Effective, sustained direct and indirect fire will inflict casualties and reduce enemy resistance. Fire support is vitally important where exposed assault forces move across open terrain or breach obstacles without adequate cover.

Moving close to supporting fire: The assault forces must move as close as possible to the supporting direct and indirect fire. This will prevent the enemy from reorganising or reacting once the supporting fire is lifted.

Support weapons rapidly to front: The aim of the attack is to destroy the enemy, capture and occupy the objective and defend it. It must be expected that the enemy will try to launch a counter attack as soon as possible to recapture terrain it has lost. Support weapons should rapidly be brought forward to strengthen positions that have been captured from the enemy.

Relentless execution: Once the attack begins ie the attacking forces cross the start line, the execution must be relentless. Relentless execution will enhance momentum, weaken enemy resolve, add speed and tempo to the attack as well as unbalance the enemy.

The above principles are relevant to all types of conventional infantry attacks, regardless of whether they are launched in the day or at night, mounted or dismounted.

The commander who applies the principles of the attack will create the necessary space in which to manoeuvre his forces, exploit his firepower, grasp the initiative from the enemy and develop advantages as they occur.

Note: This posting has been taken from the book I am currently writing and is an extract from Chapter 15: The Attack

SORRY...

For numerous reasons, I have been unable to update my blog or even answer the many private messages and comments to postings. My apologies for what may appear to be tardiness on my part but it is sometimes impossible for me to devote time to the blog – especially when I am in an area where I have no access to the internet.

 

Since my last posting, a lot has happened – or not happened:

1.      Mali’s situation worsened

2.      The conflict between North Sudan and South Sudan has intensified

3.      A coup in  Guinea-Bissau

4.      Our President married (again)

5.      President Mugabe was reported to be almost on death’s bed but miraculously recovered

6.      I had another article in Counter Terrorist magazine

7.      Joseph Kony is still at large

8.      Service delivery protests in South Africa have been ongoing

9.      The pirates continue with their actions on the high seas...

 

The list is seemingly endless.

 

I will be working on a new posting relating to the attack and hopefully, will get it done by this coming weekend.

In the meantime, thanks to everyone who continued to visit the blog during my absence as well as comment on it or write to me.

 

Regards to you all.

Eeben

MALI – ANOTHER INTELLIGENCE FAILURE

The unseating of the government in Mali was nothing other than an intelligence failure of epic proportions, not only by the Malian intelligence services but also by the member-states of the AU.

The aim of any intelligence service is to identify potential and real threats to the national interests and vital interests of the state. These threats are then targeted for intelligence collection, interpreted and disseminated. Furthermore, these agencies need to be able to make intelligence predictions based on the database of knowledge they have built up over time. It is apparent that if this was done, it was done very poorly.

In early March 2012, it was already evident that the Malian forces had lost the initiative in the north of the country. The garrison at Tessalit was under siege by the Tuareg-led separatist movement known as the National Movement for the Liberation of Awawid (NMLA). The NMLA claimed it is fighting for “independence” from Mali. Reinforcements were unable to break through to the garrison.

The NMLA had apparently been boosted by “freedom fighters” from Algeria, Chad and Nigeria. Additionally, the Malian government claimed that the MNLA had been boosted by “drug dealers, Al Qaeda factions and other Islamists” – a claim no doubt made with the hopes of getting increased foreign (US and French) support as these are matters that lie close to the heart of the US government – and Mali was a French colony.

Cut-off from reinforcements, outgunned and ultimately defeated by the NMLA in Tessalit, morale in the Malian forces was bound to take a downward turn as soldiers began deserting.

On 20 March 2012, the AU’s Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) met in the capital of Mali to discuss the ever deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region. On 21 March, the demoralised Mali forces toppled the government of Pres Amadou Toure – in the capital – by means of a coup. How the unfolding dissatisfaction in Mali military ranks was something the AU – and its numerous member-state intelligence services – had not foreseen defies belief.

For some time the Malian army has been fighting the NMLA. They have, also on numerous occasions voiced their concern at the lack of equipment, arms and ammunition with which they are supposed to fight the NMLA with. They also voiced their concern that Pres Toure had adopted a too soft approach towards the NMLA.  

Pres Toure, however well intentioned he may have been, forgot that one cannot negotiate from a position of weakness – a situation that was very evident in the north of Mali. Ironically, the leader of the coup, Capt. Amadou Sanogo, is now voicing his desire to negotiate with the NMLA separatists. The coup has however created a power vacuum and presented the NMLA the initiative in their fight against the Malian forces and it can be expected that their determination has been increased.

Given the fragility of the Sahel region with its famine, poverty, Islamic terrorism, porous borders, droughts, uncontrolled flow of weapons, along with the NMLA insurgency in the north, it is surprising that this situation was not viewed by intelligence services as a threat to both the national and vital interests of the state.

The deposed president’s seat had hardly gone cold when the fingers began pointing.

Some African government officials were quick to lay the blame for the NMLA’s insurgency the subsequent coup at the door of NATO and its allies for their involvement in Libya.

Whereas it is true that the NMLA insurgency intensified after the collapse of Gadaffi’s Libya – many of the Tuaregs fought against Gadaffi’s forces and returned to Mali after the “regime change” - it is somewhat disingenuous to blame NATO for such an intelligence failure. It will be interesting to see how the new Libyan government views this situation as the Touregs can rightly be seen as their allies.

The fact that the Malian intelligence services (if they were not part of the planned coup) along with the AU member-states’ intelligence services were unable to identify the dangers of a pending coup or anticipate a coup, shows that there was a massive intelligence failure. No amount of finger pointing can and will dispel that fact. Nor will it dispel the threat the Mali coup poses to regional stability.

The domino effect of the “Arab Spring” poses a very real danger to African governments. They need to take note of what happened – and what is happening in their own countries. But, as long as they remain complacent and ignore the dangers developing in their own countries the danger will keep growing.

If other African intelligence services remain reliant on open source information (OSINFO) and believe that just because they are not seeing things and accept that all is well in their countries, they too can look forward to their own intelligence failures in the future.  

CUT THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDING

Fighting the complex and diverse wars of today requires us to be prepared to face an enemy who has no scruples in utilising crime, and total terror against innocent civilians in order to coerce their support with the aim of placing themselves into power.

This does not mean that conventional land battles are something of the past and unconventional warfare something of the future. The fact remains that armies need to prepare for both scenarios as well as their various off-shoots.  In many instances, they will need to conduct these missions in support of the law enforcement agencies.

Utilising unconventional methods, and in the process developing their armed gangs, we have allowed these unconventional forces to move funds and equipment, ie arms and ammunition, and in some instances, sympathetic governments have even provided these thugs with passports or allowed their territories to be used for “training”.

This has given numerous terrorist groups freedom of movement as well as financial freedom. Sometimes hidden beneath layers of ostensibly legitimate business, their activities aimed at instilling terror continue – and in some instances they are still able to move large sums of money, albeit in the shape of resources, to fund their activities and crimes. Even more so when they act as proxies for governments who plan the demise of neighbouring states or aim at creating regional instability.

Much has been done with international banking laws and regulations to follow the money trail but I suspect it is the wrong approach to follow. Ex-President Thabo Mbeki recently made the claim that Africa loses US$ 50 Bn annually to illegal activities. Whereas I cannot vouch for the accuracy of this figure, I do know that the amount lost in terms of monetary value is huge.   Not only has this undermined the continent, some of this funding has also enriched and empowered those that seek to cause instability.

I dislike using the “when we” label, but when Executive Outcomes assisted African governments with devising military strategies, the prime strategic military targets were the sources of funding. This led to an outcry in the local and international media with wild claims that the company was interested in seizing the sources of funding – mainly diamonds and oil – for its own purposes.

Had those who shouted the loudest spent five minutes thinking about it, the reasons for following that strategy would have become quite obvious:

1.      Deny the enemy his source of income

2.      With no income, no weapons can be purchased or replaced

3.      With no funding, freedom of movement is curtailed

4.      With no funding, the enemy will slowly bleed itself into destruction.

What the military-strategists-posing-as-journalists failed to understand was that the enemy – call them rebels, terrorists, activists or whatever – were resorting to criminal and terror activities in order to overthrow legitimate governments. In their foolish attempts to create suspicion on the company, these so-called journalists were not only assisting the rebels but also condoning crime. The crimes got worse when young children were forced to kill their parents and elders as they were coerced into joining rebel or terror networks. This was conveniently not reported.

It is no secret that illegally mined gold and diamonds are leaving the African shores to be sold elsewhere. Much of these profits are filtered back into radical terror networks. This continued access to funds allows them to perpetuate their activities, be they crime or terror actions.

It is also no secret that some countries in Africa have become transit points for drugs shipments to Europe – some of these shipments being coordinated by criminal groups with close association with terror groups.

Despite these facts, we have done very little or nothing to attack the source of the funding. Instead, we have given these forces the freedom to continue with their activities. Ironically, they are doing so in total safety with no real aggressive efforts to stop them.

We need to drastically step up our intelligence gathering capabilities, formulate intelligence-based strategies to attack the sources of funding to reclaim our stability and neutralise those who threaten it. We need to conduct this with aggression and vigour and give no quarter to those who seek to disrupt peace and replace it with terror.  

As long as we leave the sources of funding intact, we allow these people to continue with their actions, erode our belief in the state, damage our safety and security and implement their form of rule through savagery.

PROGRESSION OF WAR AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA

Africa has been wracked by numerous wars, civil wars, rebellions and insurgencies, conflicts that have all been very similar in progression - a progression that closely follows Mao Zedong’s views on how these actions ought to be conducted.

This does not imply that those insurgencies have all been Maoist in thought and deed but rather that the Maoist progression model has been relatively easy to implement.

In the West, those who ferment such a revolution with the aim of overthrowing a government are often viewed as “freedom fighters” or “non-state actors”. Within Africa they are not viewed as such as the term itself gives those who turn to armed conflict a legitimacy that is often undeserved. As such revolutions inevitably make use of extreme torture of captured opponents, brutality towards the innocent and extreme terrorisation of the local populace, they are instead referred to as “rebels”, “terrorists” or “criminals”. 

Africa has also been witness to numerous coup d’etats, the results which have often led to the establishment of military juntas that are inexperienced in political matters and therefore prone to mismanaging the political responsibilities associated with government. This has been partly due to the large influence of politics within the military as well as the quest for ultimate power.

Conventional wars, as understood in the Western sense of conventional land battles, are not common to Africa. Although there have been large, isolated classical conventional battles on the continent post 1945, it is the manner of conduct and approach to war that differs vastly from Western military thinking. Examples of such conventional battles are the Ugandan invasion of Tanzania in 1978-79 and the South African Defence Force battles against Cuban and Angolan forces in 1987. Such conventional actions have all followed the same progression:

·        Antagonism, anger or perceived danger/threat

·        Diplomacy

·        Failed diplomacy

·        Build-up of forces

·        War

The African model for revolution is often misunderstood by Western military thinkers. This model invariably follows the following progression: 

·        The mobilisation of the people against real or perceived oppression

·        A phase of armed struggle utilising the operational environment as well as the political environment. This is usually in the form of guerrilla warfare and may include acts of terrorism. However, soft targets are of primary importance to show results and get mass media attention. It is this phase of war that is referred to as an insurgency and the fight against it is referred to as counter-insurgency. Engagements are of short duration and the insurgent will then melt away into the bush and blend into local population concentrations

·        Mobile warfare aimed primarily at rear areas with the aim of cutting supply lines and capturing arms and ammunition. This is not a phase where Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) are employed but should rather be viewed as a phase in which the insurgents mount large-scale operations. Vehicles or motorcycles may be used to deliver them to close proximity of their targets

·        Conventional warfare – a phase where mass support from the people has been given to the insurgent movement – a phase where numbers and anger will tell.

As can be noted, the above progression closely follows the Maoist model for revolution despite the fact that many insurgent groups are not Maoist organisations.

This type of progression, with variations, has become a very successful conflict-model and has proven itself in numerous armed insurrections in Africa. Although not every revolution in Africa has been successful, many important lessons are evident – lessons that remain applicable to counter-insurgency students – regardless of origin.

It is only by knowing and understanding this progression of conflict that an effective counter can be designed and implemented.

THE LEVELS OF WAR

The military strategy is an intelligence-driven, intellectual process that results in possible future or definite action.

The waging of war ie the implementation of strategy is conducted at four distinct yet inter-related levels. These levels are known as the levels of war and consist of:

1.      The political level

2.      The strategic level

3.      The operational level

4.      The tactical level.

The Political Level: Sometimes referred to as War by Political Means, this is the highest level of war and is often ignored by the military. Although the Grand Strategy or National Strategy is the highest level of strategy, the political level of war is, likewise, the highest level of war and is associated with political, economical and/or covert politico-military operations. Sometimes referred to as War by Political Means, it is the applying of political and/or economical sanctions against a country that is considered to be conducting unacceptable political practices. Likewise, financial sanctions aimed at wearing down or exhausting a country economically are further examples of war at the political level.  Other examples of the war at the political level include expelling of diplomatic staff, pressure to ensure international isolation of a threat country, international boycotts, international support to nationalist groups, and the conduct of highly-sensitive, high-level covert operations aimed at achieving a specific political goal and so forth. The conduct of highly-sensitive, high-level covert operations are usually deniable by the government. Where war at the political level may require discretionary warfare, these types of operations straddle the boundary between political and strategic level warfare yet remain highly sensitive and are usually deniable. War at the political level is ultimately aimed at bringing about a regime change without overtly committing the armed forces to direct battle.

The Strategic Level: At this level of planning, strategists and planners will ultimately be left with four definitive choices of how the government will want to resolve the situation. These are: 

·        Neutralising rebel or insurgent forces intent on usurping government support through violent means

·        Annihilating the opposing forces

·        Exhausting the opposing forces

·        Attrition of the opposing forces.

The threat, the terrain, Own Forces capabilities and the economy or support to sustain the war will determine how it will be fought at this level. Military operations conducted at this level are referred to as strategic warfare. War at the strategic level will encompass either distant or close strategic offensives as well as strategic defensive warfare.  Strategic defensive warfare can take the form of conventional, unconventional and semi-conventional operations and can include long-distance offensives, cross-border raids (sanctioned or not sanctioned) and Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations.

The Operational Level: War at the Operational Level is aimed at achieving the strategic military objectives through a series of battles and/or campaigns, conventional or otherwise, aimed at achieving the theatre objectives and can last for weeks, months and even years. These actions are not restricted to operations beyond the borders of the country but may unfold nationally as well.

The Tactical Level: At this level of war, short term engagements are fought between Own Forces and the enemy utilising Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) as the foundation of the engagements.

It is at the levels of war that the strategy unfolds via the approved military strategy, commander’s intent, designs for battle, operational plans and action. However, a lack of sound intelligence will result in weak or poorly executed strategies that may bring about a collapse of the government or a defeat of the armed forces.

Prematurely extricating the armed forces from operations that have been poorly planned and executed may lead to grave embarrassment of the state and a decline in regional and international respect. In turn, this may adversely impact on both the security of the state and even the tenure of the government.